16 August 2013

Twenty first century Egypt at a crossroads

I have no special knowledge about Egyptian politics, and I assume that I am neither more, nor less, adequately informed than the average person on the number 417 bus service from Crystal Palace to Clapham Common.

It seems to me that Egypt is flirting with the threat of a civil war between several groups: the socially-conservative but politically-radical Islamists, along with their supporters: the poor and dispossessed, who favour Shari'a Law; the socially- and politically-conservative military, along with people loyal to the rejected Mubarak regime, who favour order (and if that requires repression, then so be it); the mostly-secular progressives who overthrew Mubarak, but from whom, in their eyes, victory was snatched by Morsi and the Islamists.

From the news reports that I heard, I am left with the impression that Morsi, when he was President, was governing Egypt not as one nation, but for the benefit of those who wished for the institution of Shari'a Law, and in the teeth of opposition from those who wish the Egyptian state to have a largely secular future. Had Morsi and his government been willing, or perhaps simply able, to govern for the whole of Egypt, maybe the euphoria of the revolution that ousted Mubarak could have swept the rickety caravan along, at least for long enough to permit the establishment of a wider base of democratic institutions. However, the attempted Islamisation of Egypt's constitution was never going to win support from other than his own constituency, and ultimately led to his demise. What Morsi and his democratically-elected government were attempting to practise was effectively dictatorship by the majority, leading to the oppression of the secular minority.

I believe that the military had little love for what Morsi and his government were doing, but tolerated it while there was order on the streets. I believe that the military had equally little love for the secular progressives. When order on the streets descended into chaos in Tahrir Square, the military did the only thing they could do (apart from do nothing): they removed Morsi, re-installing themselves as the authority. (Had they chosen to attack the secular progressive protesters, they would have inevitably have undermined the authority of Morsi's government.) When Morsi supporters, outraged that a military coup was overturning a democratically-elected government, created disorder and chaos, the army did what armies are for: they killed a lot of people.

I hope that all the stake-holders in Egyptian politics are able to see that this is a fragile time, with the risk of a bad situation becoming much, much worse. It would be good if everyone felt able to take a step back away from the brink, but that takes trust, of which, I guess, there is now precious little - everyone feels betrayed!

If Egypt is to return to the democratic path, then maybe for the time being it needs the kind of power-sharing democracy that is practised in Northern Ireland, in which representatives from both communities share decision-making. The kind of representative democracy that is found in states with a long history of democracy is typically supported both with a panoply of other democratic institutions, and with a ballast of civil and judicial administration so that it is hard for the democratically-elected government to tip too far towards dictatorship by the majority. That kind of infrastructure takes time to create and take effect: the EU has been in existence for 60 years, and its structures are still far from fully accepted across the Union.

It is too much to hope for a Gandhi or a Mandela to come forward. However, I hope that some of the politicians in Egypt prove themselves to be statesmen and stateswomen.

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